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STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES  
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

A PLAN  
PREPARED FOR  
UNITED STATES ARMY  
COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE  
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

IN ACCORDANCE  
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF  
STUDY PROJECT - 06BI  
NEUTRALIZATION OF HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

BY  
MAJOR JAMES P. NEEDHAM  
27 MAY 1977

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) The author proposes these standing operating procedures (SOP) to outline policies, procedures and considerations to be used in developing viable courses of action in dealing with hostage situations directed against US Army personnel, installations and activities. It seems to be applicable to hostage situations within confinement facilities.		

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STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES  
HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

1. GENERAL

a. Purpose. The purpose of this standing operating procedure (SOP) is to outline policies, procedures and considerations to be utilized in developing viable courses of action in dealing with hostage situations directed against US Army personnel, installations and activities under this command. It is equally applicable to hostage situations inside the confinement facility as well as in any of the other command activities.

b. Conformity. This SOP represents a unified command approach in dealing with hostage situations. Supporting plans will be approved by this headquarters prior to publication.

c. Mission. The mission of the control force in priority is:

- (1) The safe release of the hostages,
- (2) The protection of the lives and well being of all affected participants,
- (3) The apprehension of the hostage-taker(s).
- (4) The protection of property and equipment.

2. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. No change in existing command relationships with the following exceptions:

(1) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) exercises overall direction for hostage incidents designated terrorist incidents. This command retains, however, actual command and operational control of the troops. In all other hostage incidents this command assumes full responsibility for direction, command and control.

(2) The Provost Marshal is designated hostage site field commander directly responsible to this headquarters. Forces under the operational control/command of the Provost Marshal will be augmented as necessary by this headquarters by placing additional forces with organic command and control elements under operational control of the Provost Marshal.

b. Command Posts.

(1) The emergency operations center (EOC) will be opened under the control of the Chief of Staff. Knowledgeable representatives from the following agencies will be assigned to the EOC to advise and

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coordinate on as needed basis. Sufficient representation should be available to insure against fatigue during a 24 hour-a-day operation over an extended period of time.

- (a) Provost Marshals Office
- (b) Staff Judge Advocate
- (c) Directorate of Security
- (d) Directorate of Facilities Engineering
- (e) Office of the Comptroller
- (f) Directorate of Plans and Training
- (g) Medical Department Activity
- (h) Public Affairs Office
- (i) Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities
- (j) Transportation Division
- (k) Criminal Investigation Detachment
- (l) Directorate of Communications-Electronics
- (m) Directorate of Industrial Operations

The Chief of Staff will also insure adequate facilities are available to accommodate representatives from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of the Army, Department of Defense, Justice Department, State Department, invited advisors (where appropriate), and representatives from State, County, Municipal, and host Country law enforcement. The Chief of Staff will further tailor the EOC to insure that only representatives who are actively engaged in advising and coordinating are actually present in the EOC. All others will be on a standby status.

(2) The senior member of the agencies providing representation to the EOC are assigned to a special advisory group (Think Tank) to the commander. The Think Tank will meet at the call of the commander to brainstorm courses of action.

(3) The Provost Marshal, as field commander, will establish a field command post in the vicinity of the hostage site. This command post will be kept austere with augmentation being provided by the EOC as the situation dictates.

c. Liaison and Coordination. The EOC will be the focal point for all liaison and coordination.

d. Communications-Electronics. A dedicated FM frequency will be used between the field command post and the EOC. Land line communications will supplement FM ASAP. As a minimum, a second dedicated FM frequency will be assigned the field commander to communicate with the

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control force. The Military Police operational net will not be used for this purpose after the Field Command Post is established. Maximum use of land line communications will be made at the EOC.

e. Orders, Reports, and Distribution. Each representative in the EOC and Field Command Post will keep a written log of the activities pertaining to each particular specialty. The Chief of Staff and the field commander will maintain a master log which will summarize the activities contained in each representative log. Maximum use of photos, magnetic tapes, video tapes and sketches will be made to supplement the logs. Each new relief in the EOC and the Field Command Post will thoroughly familiarize themselves with the activities of the previous two shifts prior to the old relief being released. Think Tank proceedings will be tape recorded and a written summary of the proceedings will be prepared by the Secretary General Staff. Summarized logs and Think Tank proceedings will be reviewed by the commander and each EOC shift, and then returned to originating agency for file. After termination of the incident all documents with photos, tapes, etc. will be forwarded to the Staff Judge Advocate for legal action.

3. COORDINATION OF TACTICAL AND TACTICAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS

a. Intelligence. The Directorate of Security representative in the EOC will coordinate all intelligence activities. As a minimum, he is responsible for acquisition, interrogation, debriefing, examination, processing and dissemination of intelligence. Other EOC representatives will respond to the Directorate of Security representative in these activities.

(1) Reconnaissance and surveillance. Ground and air reconnaissance will be made of the hostage site as needed. Maximum use will be made of photography and listening devices.

(2) Released hostages, bystanders, friends and relative of hostages and hostage-takers. Detailed interrogation and debriefing will be conducted to determine the essential elements of information (EEI) (see (10) below).

(3) Records. Personnel, medical and criminal records of the hostages and hostage-takers will be examined if available. Liaison with other agencies and/or installations is authorized.

(4) Documents. All notes, messages, etc. emanating from the hostage-taker will be analyzed. The Directorate of Security representative will insure that all logs from other representatives are read for possible intelligence value.

(5) Technical Intelligence. All tangible items associated with the situation will be inspected, if available, for possible intelligence value. Care will be taken not to destroy evidence value of

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material inspected.

(6) Maps, photographs, and terrain models. A small scale map of hostage site will be maintained, supplemented by photos of the area. Building floor plans of hostage site and adjacent buildings will be posted. Be prepared to develop a three dimensional terrain model of the site on order.

(7) Weather. Up-to-date weather situation and forecasts will be kept posted.

(8) All Source Intelligence. Intelligence gathering will not be limited to the sources outlined above. Additional sources of intelligence will be exploited as appropriate.

(9) Counterintelligence. Proposed counterintelligence measures will be coordinated with the staff of the EOC and must be approved by the commander.

(10) Essential elements of information (EEI).

(a) Identity of hostages and hostage-taker(s).

(b) Motivation of hostage-taker(s).

(c) Intention of hostage-taker(s).

b. Operations.

(1) Fire Support Coordination. The Provost Marshal is responsible for fire support coordination at the hostage site. Firepower control is essential! No fires will be authorized without the approval of the Provost Marshal unless the prerequisites for the use of deadly force are met. These prerequisites are:

(a) For protection of own life.

(b) For protection of lives of others.

(c) For protection of specific property designated by the commander as being vital to public health or safety.

Firearms are not authorized to be used to prevent offenses which are not likely to cause death or serious bodily harm, nor endanger public health or safety. The burden of proof as to whether fires were authorized rests with the individual firing.

(2) Security. The hostage site will be contained using two cordons. The inner cordon will be manned by military police. No one will be allowed within the inner cordon without permission from the commander. The outer cordon will be manned by the augmentation unit. Only military police in uniform and personnel on the access list will be allowed inside of the outer cordon. The inner cordon will be of such size that it does not allow the hostage-taker mobility. The outer cordon will be of such to prevent innocent bystanders from getting injured or killed or from interfering with the activities at the hostage site.

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The Provost Marshal has responsibility for and will exercise command operational control over both cordons.

(3) Development of the Situation. Once the isolation of the area is completed, communication will be opened with the hostage-taker. Communication should be non-threatening. The demands of the hostage-taker should be ascertained. No demands should be conceded to or rejected but must be reported to the EOC. The person initially opening communication will be selected by the Provost Marshal. He or she should be emotionally mature and able to think clearly under stress. A trained negotiator from the CID may replace the original individual as the situation progresses. Means of communication will be dictated by the situation but the following means should be used in priority if practicable:

- (a) Field telephone.
- (b) Commercial telephone.
- (c) Squad radio.
- (d) Public address set.
- (e) Bullhorn.
- (f) Unamplified voice.

If means (d) or (e) are selected the outer cordon should be positioned so that communications cannot be heard beyond the outer cordon. No assumptions will be made (see paragraph 3d., Special Considerations). All efforts will be expended to obtain facts which will be submitted to the EOC for consideration and evaluation. In this phase delay tactics will be used in order to evaluate the situation and to formulate a primary course and alternate courses of action.

(4) Army aviation operations. The Aviation Officer will alert and have on standby one fixed wing aircraft, one light observation helicopter and one utility helicopter. Utilization of these craft will be as dictated by the Chief of Staff.

(5) Chemical operations. The Chemical Officer will advise on the use of non-lethal gas in the situation. He will coordinate with Edgewood Arsenal and other research and advisory agencies to determine types of agents available for use and application procedures.

(6) Engineer operations. The Director of Facilities Engineering will identify engineer equipment available both on and off the installation which may assist in ending the situation. He will alert the Fire Department for possible use in the situation. He will provide the Director of Security with appropriate maps and building floor plans.

(7) Communications-electronics operations. The Director of Communications-Electronics has overall responsibility for communications of the Field Command Post and the EOC. He also has responsibility to pro-

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vide equipment for establishing communications with the hostage-taker. He will also provide clandestine listening devices and devices to record the events for latter prosecution and lessons learned.

(8) Military police operations. The Provost Marshal will insure that there are a minimum of three Special Reaction Teams (SRT) available trained in accordance with the procedures outlined in FM 19-15 and FM 19-10. These teams may be used to man the inner cordon. Only one team need be on duty at one time.

(9) Director of Personnel and Community Activities (DPCA) operations. The DPCA will have available a minimum of three negotiators, trained in crisis intervention techniques (see annex A for Selection Criteria). They will be used as a negotiating team; all available 24 hours a day. Individual negotiators will not be used on separate shifts. If the communicator selected by the Provost Marshal has developed rapport with the hostage-taker, there may be no need to replace him or her. Only if it appears that a trained negotiator will terminate the situation sooner will the negotiator take over the communication negotiation tasks. One negotiator will be the primary negotiator. The other two will assist in developing patterns of questions, analyze the entire situation, communicate with the command post, monitor the primary negotiator's mood, plan negotiating strategy, protect against fatigue of the primary negotiator, and take over the mission of primary negotiator should the primary negotiator be unsuccessful in establishing rapport. Once a negotiator has established rapport with the hostage-taker he or she should not be replaced except for cause.

(10) Think Tank. (Also see annex B, Brainstorming.) The senior members of the agencies providing representation to the EOC are assigned to a special advisory group (Think Tank). The Think Tank will brainstorm the situation to recommend courses of action. Each member is free to offer solutions to the problem without fear of criticism since a "far-out" solution may trigger a workable idea from someone else in the group. The emphasis is on quantity rather than on quality. The Think Tank will meet on the call of the commander. The members of the Think Tank are free to invite subordinates to the sessions if that subordinate has more in-depth knowledge of a segment of the problem than does the senior member. Prior to introducing subordinates into the session, the senior member will insure that the subordinate is knowledgeable of discussions in previous sessions. The Secretary General Staff (SGS) will arrange for an appropriate meeting place and act as recorder for all sessions. A written summary will be prepared of all sessions.

(11) Public information. (Also see paragraph 3d(4)(a)) The public affairs office representative in the EOC has responsibility for the public information program. The program will be guided by AS 300-5 with the following additional considerations:

(a) Publicity may be the hostage-taker's desire and on receiv-

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ing publicity may injure or kill the hostages. This may be especially true in situations involving terrorists.

(b) Publicity may reveal control force tactics to the hostage-taker.

(c) Simply refusing information to the news media may cause reporters to gather information from less reliable sources and publicize inaccurate information.

(d) Allowing news media personnel to communicate directly with the hostage-taker may aggravate the situation.

(e) Healthy news media relations are based on mutual trust. Trust is not built up in a short period of time. It is incumbent on the public affairs office to conduct an ongoing program to build trust so that when the command is faced with a crisis situation, this trust enhances cooperation with this command. It is also important so that the local media convey this trust to the national media should the latter send representatives to the scene. The national media is more likely to cooperate if asked to do so by their own contemporaries than if requested by the public affairs office.

(f) News media briefings should be held at a location other than the EOC.

(g) All members of the control force must be familiar with these considerations should personal interviews of members of the control force become necessary.

c. Techniques.

(1) Courses of action. No single course of action will be considered as a standard course of action except that normally lesser force options will be exhausted before escalating to more severe force options. Courses of action in increasing order of force are:

(a) Containment.-Isolate and wait.

(b) Negotiation.

(c) Cutting off utilities.

(d) Denial of food and water.

(e) Drugged food.

(f) Less lethal weapons.-Water, taser, stun gun, drugs, sound, etc.

(g) Use of police type dogs.

(h) Gas.

(i) Fire by selected marksmen.

(j) Assault.-See FM 19-15 and FM 19-10, Special Reaction Teams.

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(k) Full firepower.

These courses of action need not be used alone. For instance, containment and negotiations would normally be used together as would gas and assault. Courses of action will be determined by the commander with recommendations from the Think Tank.

(2) Tactics. Assuming a hostage situation of major proportions, the following actions will be taken.

RESPONSE PHASE - Action taken by the control force upon initial notification of existence of a hostage situation.

- (a) Isolate the area.
- (b) Establish mobilization point.
- (c) Establish field command post.
- (d) Evacuate unaffected building occupants.
- (e) Roster reinforcements, assign missions and establish communications.
- (f) Establish inner and outer cordons.
- (g) Request ambulance and medical support.
- (h) Request hostage negotiator.
- (i) Request reinforcements.
- (j) Establish crowd control.
- (k) Maintain firepower control.
- (l) Request special reaction teams.
- (m) Request firefighting support.
- (n) Activate the EOC.

CONSOLIDATION PHASE - Action taken by the control force after initial response is made.

- (a) Establish identity of hostage-taker and hostages.
- (b) Establish communications with hostage-taker.
- (c) Question building occupants and escaped or released hostages.
- (d) Obtain building floor plans.
- (e) Question acquaintances of hostage-taker and hostages.
- (f) Develop assault plan.
- (g) Position selected marksmen and gas grenadiers.
- (h) Establish Think Tank.

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- (i) Determine logistics requirements and sources.
- (j) Establish control force rotation plan.
- (k) Rehearse assault plan.
- (l) Notify other affected agencies (FBI, Host Country, HQ,

etc.)

MOVEMENT PHASE - If movement is allowed for tactical or psychological advantage.

(a) Select movement route. The route should be free from aerial observation obstructions and not pass through high tension areas (ghetto, burrio, etc.).

(b) Secure new location.

(c) Select appropriate transportation for hostage-taker and hostages. Select a vehicle which would necessitate the greatest number of hostages to be left behind. The vehicle could also be outfitted with an ignition or gas cut-off switch and/or a "beeper" to allow for electronic tracking and detection.

(d) Clear and secure movement route. Traffic control and VIP protection measures should be taken. (See FM 19-10.)

(e) Notify responsible jurisdiction(s) at new site and along movement route.

(f) Secure original location (crime scene) after move. Preserve evidence and gather intelligence.

(g) Arrange for air surveillance.

(h) Consolidate new location after move (ie, repeat consolidation phase).

d. Special Considerations. It is impossible to foresee all conceivable events in a hostage situation and to provide contingencies for each event. For this reason this SOF is configured as a framework of considerations. Intelligent application of these considerations and the use of the Think Tank will enhance the possibility of a successful outcome of the situation. In addition to the operational techniques outlined above the following special considerations will be adhered to.

(1) Assumptions. Normally no assumptions will be made of the specific facts in a hostage situation. Each element of information will be verified and analyzed before being acted upon. There are two assumptions, however, that have been verified in field practice and that tend to apply in a greater or lesser degree in all hostage situations. They are:

(a) Time is on the side of the control force. Prolonging the situation for days and weeks through constructively stalling for time produces advantages for the control force. These advantages are:

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1. Intelligence. The longer a situation is prolonged the more intelligence can be gathered on the actors, location, motivation, etc.

2. Anxiety reduction. The passage of time generally serves to reduce anxiety thus permitting the felon to assess the situation rationally.

3. Escape of hostages. It is possible that one, some or all of the hostages may find a way to escape on their own with the passage of time.

4. Exhaustion. With time the hostage-taker may tire or fall asleep which will allow a peaceful resolution of the situation.

5. Reduction of resolve. The necessary resolve to kill and/or hold out disintegrates with time.

6. Mistakes. Time allows the hostage-taker an opportunity to make mistakes which an alert control force can capitalize on.

7. Transference (Stockholm Syndrome). People when faced with a common crisis situation tend to build up positive relationships with each other. This is true in hostage situations even though one of the parties has caused the crisis. This positive relationship builds with time and makes it more and more unlikely that the hostage-taker will kill or injure the hostages. This feeling may become so strong that the hostages view the hostage-taker as their "protector" from the control force. If the hostages seem to side with the hostage-taker against the control force, this should be considered normal and in no way emotionally effect the judgement of the control forces. In a minority of cases, one or more of the hostages may build up a negative relationship (counter-transference) with the hostage-taker. This could lead to one hostage being killed while it remains unlikely that the remaining hostages will be injured. This possibility should be considered in determining courses of action after a hostage is killed. The best arrangement for transference is when a male criminal holds female hostages, there are no conversational difficulties between them and the social differences are slight.

(b) A hostage-taker's initial demands may not be what finally motivates him to surrender. The demands made by a hostage-taker should not be considered the sole key in ending the situation. For instance, a skyjacker whose initial demand was for a huge sum of money, parachutes and escape finally surrendered when offered plastic surgery to reduce the size of his nose. Another felon released his hostages and surrendered when police offered to fly his mother into the city for a reunion. Determining the real motivation is an investigative process utilizing all the sources outlined in intelligence above and by personal communication with the hostage-taker. The negotiator must not only be aware of what the hostage-taker is saying but also of how he is saying it. Subtle nuances in inflection and emotional level may be

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the key to his motivation. If face-to-face negotiations are entered into, body language and other non-verbal communication may provide additional clues. In cases where one or more hostages have been released during the siege, they should be questioned as to what they think the real motivation is for each one of the hostage-takers. Motivation may vary between multiple hostage-takers. Released hostages should also be questioned about specific comments made and conversations held with the hostage-takers so the investigator can form his own opinions as to motivation.

(2) Typologies. There are three types of hostage-takers. The first is the professional criminal, the second the mentally troubled and the third is the terrorist. The distinction is important to make because different techniques are used on each.

(a) The professional criminal. The professional criminal (dysocial offender) is a mentally stable individual with normal goals and motivations who uses crime instead of legal means to meet his goals. He turns into a hostage-taker when caught in the process of another crime in an attempt to gain his freedom. This type of hostage-taker is generally considered the least difficult to deal with as he exhibits rational behavior. The negotiations can be businesslike with limits of negotiable items specified. The negotiator should get something in return for every concession made. The primary aim is to secure the release of the hostages in return for concessions, however, even good will in exchange for cigarettes, for example, is considered a return. A show of force by the control force will display the disparity in strengths and weaken the hostage-takers resolve and usually lessen his demands. No emotion should be displayed by the negotiator thus emphasizing control force strength and bringing into realization the futility of the hostage-takers position. Face-saving measures may be suggested in order to secure a surrender. It must be remembered that the professional criminal has normal human desires, the will to live being one of the strongest.

(b) The mentally troubled. For purposes of this plan the mentally troubled are sub-divided into the neurotic, the psychotic and the psychopath.

1. The neurotic. The neurotic suffers intense anxiety depression and inner conflict. He is guilt ridden and feels inadequate. He usually represses his hostility but may "explode" into anti-social behavior. The neurotic has not severed contact with reality and is not considered insane. The negotiators primary mission with a neurotic is to lower his anxiety level and develop rapport with him. Indicate that the control force is here to help but do not talk down or condescendingly. Keep a low profile. Do not make threats or set time limits. Let the neurotic vent his feelings and frustrations. Do not offer specific solutions especially at the initial stages. Repeat back what the neurotic has just said to insure that you understood it correctly and to cause the neurotic to elaborate. The overall techni-

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que is to keep the situation as calm as possible. When rapport has been established suggest that he would gain much respect in the eyes of the public if he allowed the hostages to go free unharmed.

2. The psychotic. The psychotic is insane. He has lost touch with reality and may be suffering from hallucinations or delusions. The psychotic does feel guilt but withdraws from frustration. He may exhibit alternating depression and exaltation. He may have no insight into the nature of his behavior. The negotiators task in dealing with a psychotic is to approach the situation as a friend trying to help solve the problem the psychotic has gotten himself into. Develop rapport and allow transference to build up. Be prepared for bizarre behavior but do not allow yourself to get emotional. Keep the psychotic talking, allowing him the opportunity of developing non-violent solutions to the problem. Address only subjects that the psychotic brings up as until his background is investigated, as a new subject may trigger him into violence. Be sensitive to the time when the psychotic returns to reality and tends to exhibit guilt. At this time specifics about the hostage situation may be discussed but care must be exercised that the psychotic is not pressured into breaking contact with reality again. As in the case of the neurotic, control force should keep a low profile and all actions should be non-threatening and supportive of him as a person.

3. The psychopath. The psychopath is not insane and, in fact, is not mentally ill. He suffers from a character disorder which, built up over his lifetime, leaves him guiltless and unable to build up bonds of love. He has little anxiety over his situation and is self-centered. His desires are primitive but he has excess energy and can learn and do more than his contemporaries. Not all psychopaths are criminals. Many successful businessmen and professionals exhibit psychopathic tendencies. The psychopath disdains authority and will try and is capable of outsmarting authority. Even though it may appear that the psychopath has developed transference with the hostages or the negotiator, it is impossible that the pure psychopath can develop any feelings toward others. The negotiator should expect the psychopath to lie in a convincing manner. The psychopath will derive pleasure out of keeping the control force at bay and in outsmarting authority. It is unlikely that the psychopath will surrender voluntarily unless he sees a short range advantage in doing so. Usually he exhibits no long range planning but operates on irresistible impulse. The control force must contain the psychopath, communicate with him and capitalize on his mistakes. The more forceful courses of action must be carefully planned and rehearsed.

(c) The terrorist. The element that separates a terrorist from the other types of hostage-takers is his "cause". The cause is usually political in nature and the specific demands are made upon the duly constituted government to further that cause. As in the other typologies, the hostages are merely a tool to gain bargaining power. The

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difference is that the terrorist fully realizes the role of the hostages and is less likely to be subject to transference. He may not, however, be able to control the human dynamics of the crisis situation and, over a long period of time, actually be subject to transference. There will be a varying level of devotion to the cause in different terrorist incidents. There will also be a differing level of devotion between multiple hostage-takers at the same incident. The control force must lower the terrorists commitment to his cause to the point where he is no longer willing to give up his own life for its furtherance. This will take an extended period of time and will take the cooperation of the news media. Terrorist philosophy views sacrifice without the cooperation of the press as useless. Loss of life in order to become a martyr, however, is an acceptable price to pay. Terrorism is psychological war. It strives to polarize the population against the legally constituted government. The control force must "depoliticize" the situation. The terrorist must be made to realize that the country sees this situation not as terrorists against the government but as criminal gunmen against innocent civilian hostages with the government playing the benevolent role of protecting everyone involved. Since the terrorist will not believe the control force that the latter is the populations perception, the news media must cooperate. Terrorists are more likely to believe what they see in print or hear on TV or radio. This strategy must be communicated to the news media in order to solicit their cooperation. Access of the media to the terrorist and vice versa must be strictly controlled. Although media access is not non-negotiable, each request will be evaluated on its merits. Each demand made by the terrorists will be dissected into its subcomponents and negotiations will deal with the subcomponents. For instance if prisoner release is demanded, deal with each prisoner as a separate negotiating point. If money is demanded attempt to determine what use the money will be put to and determine if a lesser amount will be satisfactory. Once concessions are made by the terrorists a dissolution of his resolve is indicated and the negotiations can enter a more fruitful stage. Each demand will be presented and publicized as benefiting the terrorist personally as a criminal, not beneficial to any significant segment of the world population. This tends to deny the terrorist his "cause" and erodes his resolve. Publicizing denouncements from the public or other groups or individuals also involved in similar "causes" will further help to erode resolve. During negotiations, the control force will play the role of the arbitrator between the people and the terrorist/criminal. It will not play an adversary role against the terrorist/criminal. News media and control force presence and actions should be low key. This denies the terrorist one of his most potent weapons - sensationalism.

(d) Mixed typology. Very seldom will the control force face a pure type of hostage-taker. A professional criminal can also be a psychopath. There is only a fine line separating a neurotic from a

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psycnotic. The terrorist may be a soldier of fortune, a psychotic or both. To determine the typology the negotiator must amass all the information he can. This with the intelligence collected will be fed to the Think Tank for evaluation. The Think Tank must help the negotiating team develop strategies for continuing negotiations.

(3) Negotiations. (Also see annex A - Negotiator/Negotiations) All demands from the hostage-taker will be relayed to the EOC. The commander, with recommendations from the EOC and Think Tank will make final approval/disapproval/modification of all demands. The following demands are non-negotiable:

(a) Weapons of any kind. This includes firearms, knives, explosives, and any material which could be made into a weapon. The hostage-taker could be armed with a bogus weapon so negotiating weapons would only arm him.

(b) Additional or replacement hostages. A hostage-takers bargaining power goes up with the number of hostages and also the prestige of the hostages he holds. There is also the problem of "trading-up". Trading an officer for a enlisted hostage theoretically could lead to a final trade of the commander-in-chief for the chief of staff. The dilemma is; at which level does the control force stop trading-up? This dilemma is not faced if additional or replacement hostages are non-negotiable. Furthermore, the new hostage will not have had enough time to build up transference with the hostage-taker and is more likely to be injured than the hostage he was traded for.

The ultimate success of the negotiator is to secure the release of the hostages without making any concessions. Since this may prove to be impracticable, the mission may be stated as securing the release of the hostages while giving as small concessions as possible. Small concessions are defined as providing cigarettes, medicine, food, utilities, television, radios, etc. Major concessions are defined as amnesty, immunity, freedom, transportation away from hostage site, monetary ransom, freedom of government prisoners, etc. Concessions that fall between small and major are drugs, alcohol, and access to the news media.

The control force must keep in mind that concessions, especially immediate concessions, raise the expectations and commitment of the hostage-taker. Concessions on major demands will raise expectations and commitment more than concessions on smaller demands.

(4) Hostage-taking deterrents. There is only one deterrent to crime of all types. That deterrent is speedy and sure apprehension, trial and punishment. Of lesser validity is the theory that control of the news media and good faith bargaining reduce and lessen the impact of future hostage situations.

(a) News media. (Also see paragraph 3b.(11)) Flamboyant and extensive portrayal of hostage situations through the electronic and printed news media tend to increase future hostage situations through

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the contagion effect. This is especially true of inadequate personalities who see a hostage situation as possibly the only time in their lives that they will be known regionally, nationally or even internationally. This is also true of terrorists who need the news media to carry out their propaganda. Control force policy with regard to the news media is:

1. The freedom of the press will not be abridged.
2. Properly identified news reporters will have freedom of movement so long as they do not interfere with the mission of the control force. The decision as to what constitutes interference with the mission will be made on a case-by-case basis by the commander.
3. The control force will work with and not against the news media.
4. Prior to granting news media interviews with the hostage-taker, the reporter will be briefed as to the situation, the mental state of the hostage-takers, the status of the negotiations and areas which are sensitive and should not be discussed. The reporter will also be required to outline his specific questions and the manner in which he expects to present them. The commander then decides which areas/questions would constitute interference with the mission and a final interview format will be approved by both the commander and the reporter. Negotiators will be on hand during the interview to advise the reporter and also to cut communications should the reporter violate the agreed upon format.
5. Cooperation will be solicited with the news media in order that their portrayal of the incident contribute to the success of the mission. Specifically the news media will be asked to downplay some aspects and play up other aspects of the case. They will be asked to portray terrorists as criminals rather than as heroes. They will be asked to temporarily suppress some news.

(b) Good faith bargaining. Promising concessions, then failing to live up to the concessions promised can destroy control force credibility for the next hostage situation. With the extent of publicity and interest that hostage cases receive it may be reasonably assumed that most people, especially potential hostage-takers, are familiar with the record of good or bad faith bargaining exhibited by the control force. As a general policy the control force will negotiate in good faith only. Only in extreme cases and with the approval of the commander will Machiavellian strategies be used. These include but are not limited to the "knowledge bluff", "bluff-on-a-split-pair", "mutt and jeff", "stigmatized persuader", and the "overheard communication". Since all concessions will be granted in good faith, it is imperative that concessions be carefully evaluated prior to being granted. Every attempt will be made to get the hostage-taker lessen his demands to the level that the control force has authority to grant

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and to the level that this command can tolerate.

(5) Outside influences. Outside influences can have a derogatory effect on the outcome of a hostage situation. The role of the news media as an outside influence has already been discussed. Other possible outside influences must be identified and controlled. As a minimum consideration will be given to temporary termination of the reveille/retreat cannon and use of sirens in the vicinity of the hostage site. Crowds must be controlled so as not to influence the situation. Planned, non-routine events such as parades, ceremonies, athletic events, etc. must be analyzed to determine their effect on the hostage situation. Intelligence will dictate other counter-measures to outside influences. For example, it may be determined that the hostage-taker has access to Citizens Band or FM radio, therefore jamming and or intercept may be determined a viable course of action. Consideration should also be given to the control of airspace in the vicinity of the hostage site.

4. COORDINATION OF TACTICAL SERVICE SUPPORT OPERATIONS. Under this SOP there will be no changes to the existing supply, maintenance, transportation, personnel, and health procedures except that service support operations in support of this SOP will be coordinated at the EOC and will be oriented toward the various courses of action as determined by the commander. Service support representatives will be flexible enough to respond to non-standard logistics needs such as special diets, civilian type transportation, etc.

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OFFICIAL:

/s/ \_\_\_\_\_

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Annexes: A--Negotiator/Negotiations  
B--Brainstorming  
C--Hostage defense measures  
D--Selected bibliography

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ANNEX A (NEGOTIATOR/NEGOTIATIONS) to SOP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS headquarters)

1. GENERAL

This annex outlines considerations for selection of a negotiator and also depicts negotiating techniques.

2. NEGOTIATOR SELECTION

A negotiator should possess the following traits. These traits are listed in order of importance.

a. Ability to think clearly under stress. Stress in this case emanates from a life and death situation, not the stress of meeting suspense dates on reports, etc.

b. Emotional maturity. Age should not be viewed as the sole indicator of emotional maturity. An emotionally mature person exhibits objectivity rather than subjectivity on the job and in problem-solving. Emotional maturity can best be determined by an interview with the prospective negotiator and with his/her superiors, subordinates and co-workers.

c. Good listener. A good listener is a person who is more interested in learning the speaker's views than elaborating on his own. He does not constantly change the subject but asks questions which will clarify the speaker's point. A good listener is also sensitive to the speaker's body language, changes in voice inflection, eye contact, etc.

d. Integrity/credibility. This trait refers to the integrity/credibility perception of the hostage-taker. This trait also infers the negotiator's ability to appear genuinely interested. Intelligence gathered on the hostage-taker will reveal how he/she perceives age, race, nationality, religion, sex, etc. It should not be assumed that by matching the age, race, etc. of the negotiator with the hostage-taker that the hostage-taker will automatically view the negotiator as credible. In the planning stage, the negotiator should be selected based on the integrity he/she displays on the job. This type of person is likely to be able to present a credible appearance to the hostage-taker during an actual hostage-situation.

e. Ability to persuade. This trait refers to the ability to present a logical discussion (not argument) to lead the listener to accept the conclusion of the speaker. This trait presupposes the subject knowledge of the speaker and his/her ability to organize the major points of the subject and present them in an organized manner.

f. Verbal ability. This trait does not refer to a person with a large vocabulary or eloquent speech. It does refer to the ability to speak to and comprehend the language of the hostage-taker. The person possessing verbal ability understands the slang or "street language" of various subcultures and communicates in the style that is most natural to the hostage-taker without seeming to be condescending. The

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negotiator should understand such language but is not required to use it especially if such use is "unnatural".

g. Ability to avoid emotional involvement. A good indicator if a prospective negotiator possesses this trait is his/her objectivity on the job during stress situations.

h. General practical intelligence. This trait is often referred to as "being street-wise". It is built up by observing people in their natural environment rather than in a clinical atmosphere. To possess this trait a person must be interested in observing and interacting with people.

i. Ability to cope with uncertainty and ambiguity. A person whose daily duties expose him/her to vague situations would possess this trait to a higher degree than a person who performs routine or repetitious tasks. A person who seeks new duties and who does not always perform his/her duties to the letter of the regulation may also possess this trait.

j. Commitment to the negotiation program. The potential negotiator must have confidence in the philosophy of negotiations in hostage-situations and must also have confidence in him/her self.

k. Other considerations.

(1) The negotiator should not be the commander or the person who makes the decisions. The negotiator is an intermediary for the decision-maker and shields him/her from emotional involvement in the situation which then allows the decision-maker to make objective decisions.

(2) When selecting a negotiator, first priority should be given to the following types of personnel:

(a) The MP who is particularly skilled in defusing domestic disturbances.

(b) The CID agent who is adept at getting confessions that stand up in court.

(c) The psychiatrist who is successful in treating mental patients.

(d) The officer who conducts especially thorough investigations.  
ie. Art 32, AR 15-6, etc.

(e) The person who is sought out for advice on personal problems even though he/she may not be in the chain of command or in a position which is normally thought of as a personal problem solving position.

(3) Negotiator training. The negotiator should be trained in the following areas:

(a) Psychological training. The negotiator should be familiar with this SOP and the documents listed in the bibliography.

(b) Role playing/stress training. Hostage situations should be

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simulated and the negotiator required to respond. A good "actor" should be selected to play the hostage-taker to provide maximum realism. The "hostage-taker" should avoid stereotyping that position.

- (c) Physical training.
- (d) Unarmed self-defense.
- (e) Marksmanship training.

3. NEGOTIATION

There are as many negotiating techniques as there are good negotiators. The common thread connecting these strategies is that they seek voluntary cooperation and therefore make use of human dynamics. The following discussion synthesizes successful techniques and can be used as a guide until the negotiator develops his/her own expertise through experience.

a. Preparation.

(1) Be informed. Get as much accurate, up-to-date reliable evidence as possible. Important facts, arguments, statistics and quotations should be committed to memory so that they are "natural" when needed. Information should not be used as a put-down. Hold information in reserve and use only the facts needed.

(2) Learn as much as possible about your adversary. Be familiar with his neighborhood, local issues, basic values, language style (use of diction, cliches, homilies), sources of local pride and discontent, influences on his life and attitude. Sources of this information are family, friends, neighbors, and associates.

(3) Role play with another negotiator. Conduct a dress rehearsal of the anticipated situation. Use tape recorder or video tape if possible. Play back and critique the performance. Switch roles and rehearse again.

(4) Do a critical self-appraisal. Analyze personal strengths and weaknesses and discuss any source of fear, anxiety, anticipated problems with other negotiators.

(5) Be sensitive to the varied reasons underlying the attitude in question. Attitudes are formed and maintained because of needs for information, for social acceptance by other people, or for ego protection from unacceptable impulses and ideas. Information per se is the least effective way of changing attitudes and behavior. The negotiator must acknowledge that the individual is more than a rational information processor. Sometimes he is irrational, inconsistent, responsive to social rewards, or primarily concerned about how he appears to himself and to others.

b. Establishing contact.

- (1) Pick the right time. Strive not to interrupt taking of meals.

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etc. Be sensitive to the hostage-takers mood and establish contact when his anxiety level is down. When he is no longer yelling and using obscene language is an indicator that his anxiety level is down.

(2) Mode of contact. Use a telephone if possible. If not available, use a bull horn or public address set. These latter modes are less desirable because of the impersonal feeling they connote. Face-to-face contact should not be entered into until rapport has developed between the negotiator and the hostage-taker.

(3) Strategy of identification. The negotiator should try to uncover as many points of similarity as possible between him/her and the hostage-taker. Similarities can include age, sex, race, ethnic features, dress, hair, voice dialect, regionalisms, slang, jargon or group-membership identifying phrases. Similarity breeds familiarity which breeds liking and enhances credibility and greater acceptance of the message.

(4) Enhance credibility. The negotiator should present a non-threatening appearance. He should agree with him being careful not to make any concessions. Minimize manipulative intent until credibility and rapport have been built up.

c. Maintaining and directing the interpersonal relationship.

(1) Attentive listening. Listening to what the hostage-taker has to say about anything of personal interest is absolutely necessary. This not only "opens him up" for the dialogue, and helps in establishing his primary values and beliefs and the organization of his thinking, but establishes the negotiator as someone open to what others have to say. If engaged in face-to-face negotiations, maintain eye contact and stay in as close physical proximity as possible. Although Americans usually need 1½ to 2½ feet of body space which cannot be violated, violent persons need more room. Other cultures need more or less body space depending on the culture. Be alert to body language and changes in voice inflection, etc.

(2) Individuate. The negotiator should make the hostage-taker feel the negotiator is reacting to his individuality and uniqueness and not reacting to a stereotyped conception of a criminal, mental case or terrorist. The hostage-taker should be referred to by his name and title (if appropriate) or Mister/Miss/Mrs. At some point in the negotiations the negotiator should describe something personal or unique about his/her feelings, background, interests, etc. which he/she expects to be acceptable. The negotiator should not destroy the individual relationship by including him/herself or the hostage-taker into a stereotyped category. For example, a comment that "most other soldiers feel as I do about this matter" tends to replace the negotiators individuality with a stereotype of a soldier.

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(3) Reinforcement. Reinforce specific behaviors explicitly and immediately, by nodding, saying "good", "that's an interesting point", etc. Reinforce more general classes of behavior by smiling or by making it obvious that you enjoy the interaction and by being impressed with the hostage-taker's openness, sensitivity, intelligence or articulation. The hostage-taker must perceive the negotiator as a person who really cares about the demands under discussion at a personal level, not merely as a part of a role. The reinforcement rate should increase over the course of the negotiation. The negotiator must be careful not to initially overdo the reinforcement for if the hostage-taker perceives he is being placated this technique will be counter-productive.

(4) Refine identification. Based on conversation, determine the values of the hostage-taker and show a degree of respect for his values. As with reinforcement this technique should be applied with modification in order to be believable.

(5) Organize the approach. Plan the organization of the approach well enough that it seems natural and unplanned and flexible enough to modify if necessary. Do not surround the best points with tangential side points or a lot of details. Arguments that come in the middle of a presentation are least well remembered. Draw conclusions explicitly. Implicit conclusion drawing should be left for only very intelligent recipients. Repeat the main points in the argument and the major points of agreement.

(6) Tailor the approach. Do not put the hostage-taker on the defensive. If possible have him restate the negotiator's ideas and conclusions for himself in his own words. If he is very authoritarian in manner and thinking, he will probably be more impressed by status sources, decisiveness and one-sided generalizations than by information appeals, expert testimony, unbiased presentations of both sides of the issue. Any approach must be responsive to the dominant personality and social characteristics of the hostage-taker.

(7) The team approach. Although one negotiator is the primary negotiator, the remaining negotiators are not passive in the negotiating process. The remaining negotiators will assist in developing patterns of questions, analyze the entire situation, plan negotiating strategy, communicate with the command posts, monitor the primary negotiator's mood and take over the communications tasks should the primary negotiator fail to establish rapport. For this last mission it is important that the negotiators differ in some obvious characteristic such as temperament, age or sex. This maximizes the chances that one of the negotiators will be similar to the hostage-taker and promotes the subtle idea that even when people differ in outward appearance, they can still agree on the important issue, which in this case is the freedom of the hostages.

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(8) Obtaining the release of the hostages. Sometime after rapport has been built up, the negotiator will ask for the release of all the hostages and the surrender of the hostage-taker. Don't insist that the hostage-taker accept and believe the argument before he makes the behavioral commitment. Get the behavioral commitment anyway, and attitude change will follow. It may be necessary to provide several levels of behavioral alternatives for the person. Pushing the most extreme is likely to get a greater level of compliance even if the extreme is rejected. Be clear what actions are requested or what has been agreed upon or concluded. Indicate that others who appear prestigious to the hostage-taker agree that he should release the hostages and surrender. When it is believed that the hostage-taker is about to decide to surrender, take the following action. Indicate that the decision is his own; it involves free choice and no pressure. This helps insure that he will carry out the decision for he must generate his own justification for his behavior. After his decision, honestly and openly thank him in order to reinforce his behavior. Next react to something about his person which is irrelevant to the main issue such as his good diction or taste in clothes, etc.

(9) Machiavellian strategies. Machiavellian strategies imply deceit and raise moral and ethical questions, and should be used only as a last resort and only after their use has been specifically authorized by the commander. These strategies also have the added danger of destroying any hope of a negotiated settlement if the deceit is discovered by the hostage-taker. They may also damage control force credibility in future hostage cases. For this reason the commander should be aware of these strategies so he can be alert to their unauthorized use by his negotiators.

(a) Extenuation. This technique relies on the underestimating of the seriousness of the offense or the shifting of the blame to another person. Comments such as "hostage-taking is so common now that the judge will probably put you on probation" or "that hostage got just what he/she asked for" tend to put the hostage-taker into a state of emotional confusion. His sense of values tend to be disturbed and his imagination distorts his perspective. During this confusion it is possible to get concessions he would not have ordinarily made.

(b) Knowledge bluff. This technique allows for the revealing of a few known items and pretending to know more. It also includes simply lying to the hostage-taker. An example of this technique would be telling him that the hostage's relatives know exactly where in New York City the hostage-taker sent his wife and family prior to the incident, or indicate that the MP shot by the hostage-taker did not die. The dangers involved in this technique become apparent if the hostage-taker has access to the news media.

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(c) Mutt and Jeff. This technique calls for a person acting as a member of the news media or some special group outside of the control force to communicate with the hostage-taker in a rather militant style (Mutt). The negotiator (Jeff) then takes up the conversation and chastizes Mutt for his stand, then talks to the hostage-taker in a moderate, fatherly style. The danger in this strategy is that if Mutt is not cut off by Jeff in time the hostage-taker may be driven to violence.

(d) Bluff-on-a-split-pair. This strategy needs two or more hostage-takers, one of which may be in custody. It is essentially telling one hostage-taker what the other said (true or false) when the other was in private communication with the negotiator. This tends to create disharmony between hostage-takers and may cause one of them to divulge information he would not normally divulge.

(e) The stigmatized persuader. A person with a visible stigma (blind, crippled, etc.) elicits a mixed reaction. There is sympathy and a tendency to want to help in some way, but also considerable tension from guilt, revulsion and resentment. The person with the stigma states the concessions desired and indicates that if the hostage-taker does not want to make the decision now then they could spend some time together and talk it over. Embarrassed sympathy may make it difficult to terminate the conversation brusquely. At the same time the hostage-taker is uneasy conversing with or being in the presence of the person with the stigma. This may make him agree to the concession in order to terminate the interaction quickly.

(f) The "overheard" communication. In this strategy the hostage-taker is allowed to "overhear" a conversation ostensibly not intended for him. It could come from a telephone "accidentally" left off the hook or an "accidentally" keyed radio switch. It could be used to build up the credibility of the negotiator, indicate the resolve of the control force, indicate the extent and quality of press the incident is getting, make the hostage-taker move the location of the hostages, and a myriad of other uses. It is not recommended that this technique be used more than once or twice during negotiation since the hostage-taker is likely to get suspicious as to his good luck in overhearing information not meant for him.

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ANNEX B (BRAINSTORMING) to SOP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS headquarters

1. GENERAL

This annex outlines the considerations governing brainstorming sessions incident to hostage situations.

2. BRAINSTORMING

Brainstorming or "skull" sessions are a particularly good technique to use in hostage situations where it is difficult to develop viable courses of action. It is basically the pooling of ideas from a diverse audience. There are three rules that govern the conduct of brainstorming sessions. They are:

a. Criticism is forbidden. The atmosphere of a brainstorming session must be free. All members must be able to contribute without fear of criticism from the group leader or fellow participants.

b. The scope of the session is limited only by the problem it is called upon to solve. Participants are free to recommend solutions not only within their area of expertise but also within areas outside of their experience. This may trigger an idea from the person who does have experience in that area. "Wild" or "Far out" ideas are encouraged. They can be modified at a later time.

c. Quantity not quality is solicited. Various ideas should not be discussed in detail at this session. The floor should be kept open for other ideas after one has been proposed.

3. GROUP COMPOSITION AND CONDUCT

The ideal composition of a brainstorming group would be multidiscipline. A unidiscipline group stifles itself with its narrow experience base. The ideas coming from such a group represent this narrow experience base. The ideal size of the group is a relative matter. In smaller groups physical freedom is maximized but psychological freedom is inhibited. In larger groups the reverse is true. In larger groups there is a tendency for certain individuals to become aggressive and dominate the discussion while others become passive. Fortunately the nature of a crisis situation tends to mitigate this effect. Research has indicated that a group size of from twelve to fifteen works well in hostage situations. The group should meet two to four times a day in sessions from thirty minutes to one hour. Intelligence should be channeled to group members continuously so that they are prepared to react efficiently to the changing situation when the group meets. A secretary should record all ideas. Tape recorders would prove useful as long as the recording does not inhibit individual participation.

4. LEADERSHIP RESPONSIBILITIES

The brainstorming group leader has two main responsibilities. They are to clearly present the problem statement and to lead the session in order to elicit the maximum participation. The problem for the group is

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to develop techniques to perform the mission (see paragraph 1.c. of this SOP for the mission statement). The leader elicits maximum participation by maintaining group discipline, keeping order, keeping it on the subject and moving toward solving the problem. The leader should not influence members to predetermined conclusions. He avoids direct statements and is careful not to ask leading questions. He uses questions that encourage sound thinking.

5. EVALUATION

After the brainstorming session the various ideas must be evaluated. The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) provides an excellent forum for evaluation. No idea should be eliminated from consideration even though it appears, on the face, to be unworkable or counterproductive. It's possible potential must be evaluated. The idea must also be clarified since an idea that on the surface may seem obvious may be clouded when it is analyzed again. The person originally making the suggestion can clarify it and also suggest its potential value. In the evaluation stage overlapping and similar ideas should be consolidated. Often the resulting course of action is more viable than the original ideas. The criteria governing the evaluation of ideas are:

- a. Will the idea produce the desired effect?
- b. Is the idea workable? Is it supportable?
- c. Do the disadvantages inherent in the idea outweigh its utility?

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ANNEX C (HOSTAGE DEFENSE MEASURES) to SOP-HOSTAGE SITUATIONS

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1. GENERAL

If an individual plans to take hostages he understands that his bargaining power increases with both the number of hostages he holds and also with the prestige of the hostages he holds. (In America bargaining power is also increased by holding female hostages.) Since holding large numbers of hostages is difficult and requires more than one hostage-taker, prestigious individuals find themselves more and more targets of hostage-takers. Ideally the procedures outlined in this annex should be applied to all individuals in the command, although that would prove impractical. As a minimum these procedures should be applied to high risk individuals, i.e. persons who because of position, notoriety or wealth present hostage-takers with lucrative targets.

2. PREVENTION BEFORE THE ACT

The procedures outlined in this paragraph constitute a comprehensive security program for a high risk individual. These procedures must be tailored by the user depending on cost, productivity and threat constraints.

a. Personal protection.

(1) High risk individual.

(a) Keep a low profile. Publicity both professional and social should be kept to a minimum. This also applies to photographs and information regarding families, personal affairs, income, travel plans, and club memberships.

(b) Avoid routines. Vary arrival and departure times and routes. Use routes through highly populated and well lighted areas.

(c) Recognition of surveillance. Learn to recognize signs indicating individual is under surveillance.

(d) Travel arrangements. Individual should always notify family or organizational member of destination and expected time of arrival.

(e) Code system. Simple code words should be developed for each individual which will notify family or negotiator of actual situation or of danger. These should be words not normally used by the individual but which could be used in a normal conversation.

(f) Personal data. Personal data should be kept in a safe place and updated periodically. This data should include color photographs, (including family members), fingerprints, signature samples, voice tapes, and a biographical data sheet. The biographical data sheet should include:

1. Complete name.
2. Addresses of all residences.
3. Personal telephone numbers.

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4. Complete physical description including scars and other unusual identifying characteristics.

5. Location and account numbers of savings and checking accounts, safe deposit boxes and investments.

6. Name of local physician, dentist and optician.

7. Automobiles-license numbers, make, model, year, color and identification numbers.

8. Schools attended by children.

9. Names, addresses and telephone numbers of family, relatives and friends.

10. Credit card companies and card numbers.

11. List of boats, campers or recreational vehicles.

12. Hobbies, clubs, activities.

(2) High risk individual's family.

(a) Keep the doors to children's rooms open so unusual noises can be heard.

(b) Make child's room unaccessable from the outside of the house.

(c) Don't leave children unattended.

(d) Instruct family and servants to keep the doors and windows locked and not to admit strangers.

(e) Teach children how to call police and to do so if they see strangers around the house.

(f) Arrange for code words known to children's teachers. Teachers will verify parents call to release children from school by requiring caller to give the code words. Otherwise children will not be released from school.

(g) Require schools to provide adult supervision in school playgrounds.

(h) Instruct children to travel in groups, use heavily traveled streets, avoid isolated areas, refuse automobile rides and refuse to accompany strangers on foot.

(i) Use city-approved recreational areas under adult supervision.

(j) Instruct children never to leave home without telling parents where they are going, who they are with and what time they expect to return.

(k) Instruct children to immediately report anyone who molests or annoys them to the nearest person of authority.

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(1) Family awareness. The family should be alert to suspicious activities or occurrences. Beware of ruses aimed at gaining admittance to the home. Repairmen, salesmen, etc. should not be allowed admittance unless there is a prior arrangement initiated by the family or after a call to the sending organization to verify the person's identity and physical characteristics. Remember that the repairman, etc. could have been ambushed on the way to make the call and a kidnapper, using his clothes and vehicle, could be replacing him. Also be aware of the "distressed motorist" who wants to make a telephone call. Have the person remain outside and the family member make the call for him/her.

b. Office protection.

- (1) The office should not be directly accessible to the public.
- (2) The office should not be located on the ground floor.
- (3) If office windows face public areas have them curtained and reinforced.
- (4) Access to the office should be monitored by a secretary or guard in the immediate vicinity of the entrance.
- (5) Consideration should be given to having the door automatically locked from within and having it remotely controlled.
- (6) Draw attention away from the location and function of the office.
- (7) Install a silent alarm on both the door and the desk of the high risk individual.
- (8) Install a pass and badge system. Picture and signature badges for regular visitors and a log in badge procedure for casual visitors.
- (9) Install a metal detector at entrance to office.
- (10) Install key control procedures. Insure office is not locked with master key. Change locks periodically.
- (11) Have a "saferoom" in the vicinity of the office. It should be unidentified, have a sturdy door and lock and easily accessible from the office. It should contain emergency, first aid and communication equipment.
- (12) All common areas such as maintenance closets should be kept locked. All restrooms (except one for public use) should be kept locked.
- (13) After hours, access should be strictly controlled. Key offices should be checked periodically after hours.
- (14) Remove name or position from parking areas and replace with numbers. Periodically change parking area assignments.

c. Home protection.

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- (1) Install a means of viewing a caller from within on all doors.
- (2) Install double dead-bolt locks on doors and supplement with chain-bolt locks.
- (3) Install special locks on glass doors to prevent prying.
- (4) Use shutters or smash resistant materials on windows.
- (5) Install protective lighting to illuminate the area outside the home.
- (6) Use electric timers to activate lights, radios and TV's when the house is unoccupied.
- (7) Consider the use of alarms-both the local type with a loud audible signal and the silent type that is wired into the police department.
- (8) Construct a safe room using the same prerequisites as the safe room at the office.
- (9) Keep telephone numbers unlisted. When receiving a call do not identify self until the identity of the caller is known.
- (10) When traveling do not stop mail and newspapers. Have a person pick up your newspapers and mail daily and use your ma'lbox to mail his letters. Have him also move the car in the driveway daily, put out and take in the garbage cans, etc.

d. Travel protection.

(1) General. Do not let travel plans become generally known. Change routes, departure times, arrival times and days of travel. Do not allow a routine pattern be established. Avoid traveling alone or at night. Use heavily traveled and lighted routes.

(2) Auto travel.

- (a) Keep doors locked and windows up.
- (b) When not in use keep auto in locked garage.
- (c) Keep gas tank at least  $\frac{1}{2}$  full and lock gas cap.
- (d) Consider installation of auto intrusion alarm.
- (e) Consider installation of two-way radio or telephone communications.
- (f) Take formal instruction in offensive and defensive driving techniques.

(3) Commercial air travel. In the United States commercial air travel has become one of the most secure means of travel. This is because of the stringent ground security protective measures initiated to

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thwart skyjacking. Care should be exercised, however, when traveling on carriers which use overseas airports. Not all countries have initiated ground security to the same degree as the USA.

(4) Organizational aircraft travel.

- (a) Remove distinctive organizational logos or markings from the aircraft.
- (b) Secure hangers. Consider installation of intrusion and tamper alarm systems.
- (c) Secure access ports. Consider installation of metal detectors.
- (d) Institute preflight security inspection measures.
- (e) Consider use of guards in high risk areas.
- (f) Coordinate security measures at receiving airport.
- (g) Be security conscious going to and from the airport.

3. SURVIVAL DURING THE ACT

Victimization studies have found that the victim often contributes to or mitigates the physical and psychological harm done to them. The purpose of this section is to outline the threat and techniques that can be used by the hostage to mitigate the mental and physical harm that may otherwise befall him/her.

a. Threat. The threat to a hostage varies from case to case. The threat to a female hostage who has little social differences with or conversational difficulty with a male criminal type abductor faces a relatively minor threat. On the other hand the politician or military figure abducted by terrorists who come from a different culture or subculture and speak a different language, faces a far more serious threat. This section addresses both threats but is especially applicable to the latter threat.

(1) Physical threat. By far the greatest threat to the hostage is in the initial stages of a hostage situation. The hostage-takers are anxiety laden and likely to overreact to relatively minor resistance from the hostages. The threat is also significant but not as high if/when the control force assaults the hostage site. In this stage the hostages are as likely to be killed or injured by the control force as they are by the hostage-takers. In a hostage situation the threat diminishes with the passage of time, assuming the control force and the hostage-takers are engaged in the negotiation process. Physical torture, even in a terrorist incident, is unlikely. Terrorism is psychological warfare. The greatest threat in all hostage situations is the psychological threat.

(2) Psychological threat. The greatest fear a hostage will have initially is the fear that he will be killed by the hostage-taker. As

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the situation progresses through days this will be replaced by the fear he will be killed by the control force should they decide to assault. This fear may cause the hostages to capitulate to every demand made by the hostage-takers. This causes the hostage-taker to view the hostages as less than human and reduces the chances that transference will take place and increases the chances that the hostages will be injured. In this case the hostages are viewed as "sniveling" cowards and are more likely to be denied human rights. This also has long range effects as the hostages normally lose self respect after they are released. This can be devastating psychologically. Less likely (in domestic hostage incidents) are the threats of rape, homosexual assault, stripping and degrading, denial of sanitary conditions or equipment, deprivation, starvation, etc. Indoctrination (brainwashing), however, is more common. Even in nonpolitical situations the hostages are exposed to the philosophy of the hostage-takers. The danger is that the hostages are at the mercy of their captors. Not only their lives but their basic needs such as food, shelter and clothing are dependent on the good will of their captors. Since the hostages are essentially in the same position as a pet dog they are more receptive to propaganda. It is not unusual for hostages to espouse the hostage-taker's rhetoric. This causes a conflict after release since the hostages must again join the larger society which does not necessarily agree with the points in question. It is not unusual for the hostages to continue communications with the hostage-takers long after the incident. In the extreme the hostage would join the hostage-takers. This is, however, the exception to the rule.

b. Hostage response.

(1) Mental. The hostage must first deal with the threat of death. He must remember that his life provides good insurance for the life of the hostage-taker. Dragging the situation on also provides a lot of media coverage for a terrorist or religious fanatic. This thought should help mitigate the fear arising from repeated threats by the hostage-taker that the hostages will be killed. It is important for the hostage to develop, in priority, what things are more precious to him than life. First he should list things (principles) he is willing to die for. Next he should list conditions he will resist with his life because they are so repugnant and degrading that acceptance would reduce him to nothing more than an animal. Lastly he should list those things he can endure because they do not deeply interfere with his mental health or spiritual standards. The hostage must be realistic in his priorities since one must accept treatment in a crisis situation that would be unacceptable in day-to-day living. Neither is it likely for a hostage to be subjected to violations of principle or conditions so odious to warrant giving up his life. Furthermore, it is also impossible to completely negate the trauma a hostage situation creates. The importance in developing such priorities is that it assists in giving the hostage control over his

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destiny thereby reducing the hostage-taker's complete control of the situation. It also engenders respect from the hostage-taker in that the hostage is not reduced to the state of an animal but remains a civilized human. The hostage's greatest psychological enemy is himself if he does not exercise self-discipline. There is a strong tendency to relax personal cleanliness standards and to give in to despair. The hostage must guard against this pitfall by attempting to maintain control over his environment. Even the simplest activities in a crisis situation will assist the hostage in viewing the situation rationally and help him avoid the pitfall of identifying with his captors. Among those activities are:

(a) The hostage must keep mentally alert. He must avoid falling into a state of despair by constructive thinking. He can formulate and refine escape plans, mentally design a home, plan his month's budget, formulate vacation plans, etc. He must also be alert for information that can help him or the control force to end the situation successfully. He should memorize every detail no matter how minor. Minor details often provide the key clue in finally ending the situation. He should use a memory system or simply repeat the information until it is committed to memory. Valuable information is number, sex, race, nationality of the hostage takers along with their motivation and clues as to what minimum concessions will motivate them to surrender. This type of information may be able to be transmitted to the control force using code words should the hostage-takers allow the hostage to communicate with the outside world.

(b) The hostage must eat everything he is given. Rejecting strange or foul food does nothing but weaken the hostage and reduces his ability to psychologically control his own situation. By using imagination the hostage can turn a piece of stale bread into a gourmet meal.

(c) Rearrange surroundings. The simple act of moving a sleeping cover asserts the hostage's control over his environment.

(d) Keep order. If denied toilet privileges designate a part of the surroundings for this purpose. Similarly there should be an eating area, a washing area, and a rest area. All these subdivisions may be within inches of each other. The purpose of this technique is not as much to provide pleasant surroundings as it is to keep order in the hostages own mind.

(e) Keep time. Be aware of day and night. Use tick marks on the wall to keep track of days.

(f) Be aware of psychological traps. There is a natural tendency to identify with the hostage-takers (transference). While it is desirable for the hostage-takers to think the hostage identify with them it is undesirable from both a tactical and long range psychological view

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for this actually to occur. In the short range any statements by the hostages indicating they deeply agree with the hostage-takers tends to emotionalize the control force and makes rational and logical decision making more difficult. In the long run the hostages will have to return to the community from whence they came and will incur difficulties in readjusting after the situation is over. This identification process can be used to the hostage's advantage if he understands the dynamics involved. The hostage-takers too are subject to transference and are more unlikely to harm the hostages after it builds up. The hostages should try to speed up the transference process by using the same techniques prescribed for the hostage negotiator. In this way the hostages can avoid being a part of the problem and can actually become part of the solution. Above all else the hostages should avoid alienating his captors. This statement should not be interpreted as implying total compliance with all the hostage-takers demands and requests. It should be realized that the hostage-taker has been exposed to some degree of socialization and realizes the bounds of acceptable behavior.

(2) Escape. The general rule covering escape is that when in doubt do not try to escape but cooperate with the hostage-takers. Although escape of the hostages has successfully ended hostage situations, it is relatively rare compared with the incidents ended by using negotiation. Escape should be contemplated, if for no other reason, than it occupies the mind of the hostage, strengthens his selfesteem, and causes him to be more observant. Opportunities for escape present themselves primarily at two points in the situation. One is immediately after capture and the other is after transference has taken place and boredom has set in.

(a) Immediately after capture. Immediately after taking hostages the hostage-takers are in a state of general confusion. This is true even if the operation was meticulously planned. They are faced with strange surroundings, strange people and are in an anxious state which is the natural result of the act itself. The appearance of confusion and anxiety may not be readily apparent as the hostage-takers issue orders and instructions, usually in a gruff and authoritative voice. It is at this time when the hostages can capitalize on the general state of confusion by jumping through a window, hiding in a stairwell, "saferoom", etc. or simply running away. Some previous thought must have been given to the escape plan at a particular location as the hostages too will be in an anxious state and affected by the general state of confusion. The best plan is the simple plan. Elaborate plans which are based on sequential events or split second timing have little chance for success.

NOTE: As covered previously, the greatest physical threat to the hostages is also immediately after capture. The hostage should be guided by the general rule covering escape attempts; that is when in doubt do not attempt to escape but cooperate with the hostage-takers.

(b) After transference and boredom have set in. As the situation

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drags on for hours, days and even weeks and the initial excitement has turned into boredom, the hostage-takers tend to become lax. An exception to this rule is the psychopath who is likely to stay alert for extended periods of time. The hostage should also be aware of the effects of drugs the hostage-takers are taking to keep themselves alert. This laxness can range from a guard being distracted by a radio broadcast to all the hostage-takers falling asleep while the alert hostages simply walk away. The hostages can accelerate this laxness by assuming a subservient attitude prior to the escape attempt. The optimum escape time is in the early morning hours after the guard has been on duty for a minimum of one hour. The actual escape attempt should be planned so as to avoid rather than confront the hostage-takers. A diversion in the way of a gas leak or shortcircuited electrical system may also prove helpful. The hostages should feel reasonably sure of success since if the attempt is unsuccessful the hostage-takers are likely to improve security measures and any transference that has been built up may be destroyed. The key to the escape plan is ingenuity, observation of the hostage-takers and taking advantage of their mistakes.

3. LESSONS LEARNED AFTER THE ACT

As soon as medically feasible after the hostages have been released and before any press conference, the hostages should be individually debriefed. The debriefing should consist of allowing the hostage to tell the story in his own words. This session should be audio or video recorded for playback to the Think Tank (brainstorming group). Each member of the Think Tank will formulate questions while listening to each hostage's narration of the situation. At a second session each hostage will respond to questions from the Think Tank. The Think Tank will deduce lessons learned to be used for changing, updating or verifying the plan.

4. PSYCHOLOGICAL PROBLEMS AFTER THE ACT

Depending on the scope of the hostage incident the hostages may suffer from certain psychological difficulties. These problems may be feelings of loss of pride, loss of dignity, loss of control over their lives with the resulting feeling of vulnerability. Physical manifestations of these problems in the form of diarrhea, nausea, headaches, sleeplessness, anxiety and fear of the dark may occur. In addition hostages who were treated better than other hostages or hostages who were released prior to other hostages may suffer feelings of guilt. The debriefing itself will help to mitigate these psychological problems as it allows the hostages to ventilate their feelings. The hostages should be made aware of the possibility of psychological problems arising, be assured that it is normal after a hostage incident and be instructed to seek assistance if the symptoms appear. They should also be made aware of the fact that the worst thing they can do is keep their feeling to themselves. They should discuss their feelings with others, especially other hostages. The hos-

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tages can receive professional help from psychiatrists, Organizational Effectiveness officers and graduates of the Management Development Course.

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